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Abstract
This study focuses on behavior of everyday Aotearoa
New Zealand (Aotearoa) home users of Internet
of Things (IoT) consumer devices.
It considers
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) as an approach to
modification of user behavior to improve safety in terms
of privacy and security. Our aim is to better understand
safety for everyday users of IoT consumer devices in
the home. We want to understand human barriers to
safety in Aotearoa users’ perceptions and behaviors,
and learn what everyday users perceive and understand
about IoT privacy and security at home. This study aims
to investigate IoT user behavior alignment with PMT.
The main contributions of this paper explore Aotearoa
users’ perceptions and behaviors towards IoT devices
in the home through the theoretical lens of PMT, and
determine which of the four factors of PMT contribute
to user behavior.

1.

Introduction

IoT is expanding at a rapid rate and is becoming
ubiquitous in our society, and increasingly our homes.
Existing privacy and security protections are not keeping
pace with changes, and many dangers are posed to users.
User-focused IoT privacy and security for everyday
Aotearoa users in the home is under explored in the
literature.
It is important to state technical definitions for the
terms privacy and security, in respect of this paper. Data
privacy can be described as “the aspect of information
technology that deals with the ability of an organization
or individual to determine what data in a computer
system can (or cannot) be shared with third parties”
[1], or “the controlled release of information” [2]. In
the context of cyber security, security is concerned
with protecting information integrity, confidentiality and
accesssibility [3] [4].
The concepts of privacy and security are joined;
without some degree of privacy (an ability to control
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the release of personal data) people have concerns about
security (confidentiality, integrity and availability).
Issues concerning privacy and security relating to
information that is stored, processed and transmitted by
traditional computers have caused problems for many
years [2].
Current privacy and security protections are not
keeping pace with the many dangers that users face.
User behavior is also shaped by the policy and
legislative environment, therefore this is another facet
that must be considered in relation to IoT privacy and
security. IoT technology has evolved rapidly, leading
to a rapid innovation cycle. There is a rush to get
devices to market quickly, leading to severe deficiencies
in security. It is a very heterogeneous market, and design
solutions are diverse. There are competing or lacking
regulations, standards, protocols and frameworks for
manufacturers to adhere to, leading to poorly tested
devices with complex communication being released
to market [5] [6] [7]. Everyday Aotearoa users are
ill-prepared to manage and mitigate the risks that arise.
The rush to market with new devices results in a lack of
standards and protocols, and the legislative environment
is lagging in response to the new challenges that arise
from IoT.
In this study, privacy and security issues related
to user behavior with IoT consumer devices are
explored. A qualitative study was conducted which used
PMT as a theoretical lens through which to examine
behavioral aspects. This research is concerned with
establishing current IoT privacy and security problems,
and understanding why these issues exist. This work
provides new insight to the field, and aims to add
to understanding to increase the level of privacy and
security for the everyday Aotearoa user of IoT in the
home.

2.

Related Work

Investigation into human behavioral aspects of
IoT data privacy and security in the home is under
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investigated in Aotearoa. We could find no Aotearoa
based academic research publications with a user focus
on IoT privacy and security for everyday Aotearoa
users in the home. An industry report from Unisys
(September 2019) surveyed one thousand customers
across Aotearoa and found that approximately one
quarter had experienced the virtual assistant on a smart
device (speaker, watch or phone) listening in when it
had not been actively turned on. Interestingly, only
half of these customers (half of the quarter affected),
considered that occurrence to be a cause for concern [8].
In 2018 Dupuis and Ebenezer conducted research
focusing on USA users, using PMT as a theoretical
framework to see whether users cared about privacy
violation by IoT devices. The first part of their
research centered around examining customer reviews
of home IoT devices. Fifty reviews were selected for
each of ten top rated IoT devices sold via the online
retailer Amazon.com. The researchers examined the
extent to which privacy issues came up in customer
reviews. Secondly, they conducted eighteen interviews
with university students to study their comprehension
of, and concern with, privacy relating to IoT devices.
The last part of their study was a survey examining
the constructs of PMT in relation to these devices.
Dupuis and Ebenezer were particularly interested in how
participants evaluated IoT smart home devices from the
perspective of privacy, if at all, when they were making
purchase decisions. They were also interested in the
importance of the privacy issue based on the customer
reviews chosen. The study concluded that users do care
about having their privacy violated by an IoT device,
and the associated risks. The study also found that
users are more willing to act to protect themselves if
they believe they can understand ways of doing so, but
only if they do not consider the costs to be too high.
Interview participants in this study were supplied with
a report detailing security concerns and vulnerabilities
directly before their interview, to establish a baseline
knowledge [9].
A 2016 Aotearoa study Compromising Privacy for
Convenience and Wellbeing on the Internet of Things
(IoT) investigated the extent to which potential IoT
users in Aotearoa were prepared to compromise their
privacy for the sake of convenience and wellbeing,
and specifically the use and attitudes of Aotearoa
residents toward emerging IoT, particularly relating to
the collection, storage and use of Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) by organizations. Scenarios were
constructed in Second Life and shown to a group
of 15 researchers and industry participants, and a
questionnaire was rolled out to a selection of Aotearoa
residents, resulting in 1200 usable responses. Results

from this study showed a high level of concern
surrounding the collection, storage and use of personal
data relating to IoT devices [10].

3.

Data Collection

Figure 1 depicts the steps that were followed in our
interview process for data collection.

Figure 1. Interview process steps

3.1.

Methodology

We chose a qualitative research method to fully
explore the topics included in this study, as the technique
of qualitative research is particularly well suited to small
scale studies [11]. This approach is suited to the nascent
stage of phenomena investigation [12]. This research
was a small-scale study, conducting semi-structured
interviews with the intended result of gaining insights
into the level of risk involved with IoT use for everyday
(non-expert) Aotearoa users.

3.2.

Research Design/Participant Recruitment

A convenience sample was chosen, with voluntary
participation. In an effort to avoid any bias, individuals
were recruited from different demographics. Five
participants were recruited via personal contacts, from
a suburban area in the Greater Wellington region of
Aotearoa. A range of participants took part, with
a spread in age from teenagers to older adults, and
a mix of genders, occupations and life experiences
all represented in this study.
This study looked
at adult users’ behavior, so one eligibility criterion
for participants was that they were aged eighteen
or over. The target audience was everyday users,
therefore participant selection precluded those could
reasonably be perceived as having either an expert
level of knowledge, or conversely those who would not
purchase internet technology themselves. No vulnerable
members of society were invited to participate.
Participants were invited to take part, and were
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advised that they were under no obligation to do so. It
was made clear that their responses were confidential
to the research team, that their information would be
securely stored and destroyed within a stated time
period, and that no PII would be attributed to them. It
was indicated to them that they were welcome to leave
the interview at any time, and would still receive a koha
(compensation) for taking part.

3.3.

Interview Structure

We constructed an interview question guide in the
form of questions, with deeper probing questions to be
used as appropriate to encourage responses. Questions
were designed in the form of opening (general)
questions, specific (key) questions and broader (closing)
questions all included in the interview guide. In a
semi-structured interview approach, a conversational
style was used in the delivery of questions, with some
new questions arising organically as the interviews
progressed.
The interview question guide was organized into
sections that each covered a certain theme or topic.
Questions were framed around PMT. Rogers first
formulated PMT in 1975. The variables determining
protection motivation were stated as severity (of
an event), vulnerability (probability of the event
occurring if no protective behavior was performed),
and response efficacy (efficacy of the recommended
behavior). PMT was updated in 1983 by Maddux
and Rogers, and presented as a more general theory
of persuasive communication. Personality and past
experience (stimulus variables) believed to influence
an individual’s cognitive process were identified. The
theory was also updated with new constructs including
rewards associated with the threat, response costs and
self-efficacy [13], [14], [15]. PMT posits that when
faced with a threatening event, people carry out two
processes of appraisal. One is focused on the threat
itself (the threat appraisal), and the other focus is on
their ability to counter the threat (the coping appraisal).
When people are conducting the threat appraisal, they
will consider how negative any consequences of the
threat might be (the perceived severity) and consider
what is the likelihood of the threat occurring in a way
directly affecting them (the perceived vulnerability).
When conducting their coping appraisal, people will
consider whether following a recommended course of
action will result in the removal of the threat (response
efficacy), and consider how confident they would be
to carry that action out (self-efficacy) [14], [16], [17].
PMT is a well-established theory, which was originally
developed to provide an explanation of how to influence

risky behavior, and to determine what components a
persuasive message should include. PMT builds on
the theory of fear appeals. At its core is the idea that
an individual’s behavior is influenced by their threat
appraisal (the severity and likelihood of an unwanted
consequence), and their coping appraisal (the efficiency,
manageability, and cost of the risk reducing behavior)
[14]. Simply put, the PMT posits that the behavior
individuals form is the result of a cost benefit analysis,
where associated behavioral risks are compared to the
cost of trying to reduce (or eliminate) the risks [15].
Each question was mapped to a specific objective to
elicit appropriate data.
Participants were initially asked questions regarding
general technology and internet usage habits. The next
section focused on awareness of privacy and security
using two internet connected toys as interview aids.
These toys were consumer devices, readily available and
marketed as fun, modern, internet connected devices
that would appeal to children. One was marketed
to children aged 3+, and provided real-time audio
communication plus access to web based resources, in
an appealing soft-toy exterior. The other was marketed
as ages 8+, and provided mobile, real-time photo and
video communication, inside a fun automotive vehicle.
Our intention was to use these toys as a discussion
prompt, to draw out users’ understanding of the privacy
and security risks that exist with internet connected
devices readily available to the everyday consumer, and
marketed towards children. Participants were asked
about their perception of the safety of these toys,
whether they would research security aspects if they
were (hypothetically) going to purchase the toy for a
child or family member, and where they might search
for security advice. Participants were then asked about
security risks including their perception of the severity
of a threatening event, and their perception on the
probability of the occurrence, or vulnerability.
Participants were asked about potential mitigations,
the efficacy of recommended preventative behaviors,
and their own self-efficacy.
Effects of changed
ownership were discussed, and a general reflective
question concluded the interview. No actual testing
of privacy or security has taken place on these
devices at this point. Ethical Approval for this study
was gained from the Human Ethics Committee at
Victoria University of Wellington, approval number
0000027885.

3.4.

Coding and Themes

The process of coding involves organizing the data
by analyzing text then writing a word that represents a
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theme in the margin [18]. Audio recordings taken during
the data collection were reviewed and coded into themes
[19]. These themes were: Awareness of Risks; Trust;
and Level of Concern relating to Risks. Reviewing the
findings, it became apparent participants gave multiple,
varied responses which could be further interpreted into
multiple categories. The three themes and 15 categories
are discussed below.

3.4.1. Awareness of Risks An individual’s
awareness of risks has an effect on what private
information they disclose [20]. When interviewed
for this piece of research, participants showed
varying degrees of awareness of risks. To allow
for sufficient richness in data from interview responses,
the participants were not prompted with any literature
prior to the interviews. Nor were they questioned
about their understanding of the terms risk, privacy,
or security. Participant risk awareness responses were
coded into three categories of risk including users who
were unaware of risks, users who were aware of only
some of the potential risks, and users with a general lack
of IoT knowledge (and therefore a lack of knowledge
about the inherent risks).
Users were Unaware of Risks Some users indicated
that they were unaware of the risks present when using
IoT devices in the home. This applied to both the extent
and the types of potential risks. Some risks had not even
occurred to the participants before the interview. One
participant did not recognize the inherent danger present
in the privacy and security of these types of devices.
The following data points from two participants
highlights a lack of awareness. When asked about
hesitation giving the toy to child or family member, P2
responded “I feel like I’m saying yes because of the
interview but if I just saw it on an ad or the shelf it
wouldn’t seem dodgy, but because I’m thinking about
it more it seems like it would have potential. I probably
wouldn’t think about the danger”. When probed about
where recorded or streamed footage would be stored, P1
stated “The child sees the picture on the tablet”, and
confirmed they would have no hesitation in giving the
toy to a child, calling it “a cool thing to give to a child”.
Users were Aware of only a Limited Aspect of Risk
In addition to the users who were not aware of any
risk to using IoT devices in the home, some users
identified only certain aspects of potential risks, and
were not aware of the full extent of those risks. These
participants showed an awareness that some degree of
risk was present, but either underestimated this risk or

did not fully comprehend the full dangers that the risks
may present to a user. “If (the toy) was being used by
a child with another child it could be a risk because
you don’t know who could be at the other house. It
could be totally abused. At both ends”. In making
this observation, P5 identified risks stemming from user
misuse, but did not mention other risks that could be
present, such as the device being hacked into, or a
database being compromised. P1 identified risks in one
area only, therefore their concern centered around the
child causing mischief rather than risk posed to the child
as a victim of malicious activity from outside sources
observing “It looks like it’s aimed at children and they
could get up to all sorts of mischief”.
Users Lack Technical, or IoT-Specific Risk
Knowledge, Contributing to level of Risk Awareness
In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld, former United States
Secretary of Defense stated “as we know, there are
known knowns; there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to
say we know there are some things we do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we
don’t know we don’t know” [21]. In this sub category
of the research, users did not know the unknowns, with
responses indicating that users had a lack of technical,
and IoT-specific knowledge.
Even though all users interviewed were users of
technology, there was a lack of awareness or confidence
in their knowledge of how the technology actually
operated. Users were not shy to admit their lack of
technical expertise, appearing unconcerned about their
lack of technical and IoT-specific knowledge. It is
important to recognize that risks may be posed by this
lack of knowledge, and the apparent indifference to it.
Over half the participants exhibited a lack of knowledge
in the technical area.
Examples supporting this claim include P2 stating
“I don’t know how the smart speaker works, I think it
just connects itself to the internet, I don’t really know”.
P5 said they would have to believe what they were told
as they do not have the technical expertise to know
differently, so they would “Have to take their word for
it”. P1 stated “No, I wouldn’t have a clue”. As well as a
generalized lack of technical knowledge, one participant
showed a clear lack of understanding of IoT-specific
technology, with P2 stating “I didn’t even know what
Internet of Things was until today”. This was somewhat
surprising, given that this participant was a prolific user
of general technology, and used multiple IoT devices
within their home environment.
From this observation it could be deduced that IoT
devices designed for home use are easy enough to set up
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and use, without the user possessing a full understanding
of either device operation or security.

3.4.2. Trust When observed from the angle of
human factor, trust can be viewed as two main
categories. Firstly, inherent characteristics (part of
the individual), and secondly situational characteristics
(outside of the individual). Trust as a human factor
in relation to risk assessment in cyber security also
relies on understanding how different mental models
and risk postures impact both the level of trust given to
individuals and the biases that affect the ability to give
that trust [22].
Trust-related responses from interview participants
were coded into multiple categories. The categories of
trust included users who believed that ’someone else’
would manage the risk for them, users who had an
inherent trust in human nature, users who believed that
technology would protect their privacy and security, and
users who were willing to believe what they were told
by other sources.
Users Believed Someone Else was Managing the
Risk for them Threat risk can be categorized into
four risk response strategies which include Avoidance,
Transference, Mitigation and Acceptance [23].
In their interviews, it appeared as though some
users were unconsciously applying this model, with
some users believing that other people would assume
the responsibility of managing privacy and security on
their behalf. One participant expected the companies
they were dealing with to manage the security of their
data, as part of the usual business process. Two of
the participants believed that their network security was
being attended to by their Internet Service Provider
(ISP). These participants were comfortable in their
belief that their security was adequately attended to by
other parties. The following responses illustrate these
claims.
P3 relinquished the responsibility for dealing with
privacy and security issues to their ISP and other
companies they are dealing with, stating “I expect the
companies who I trust with my data to protect it”, and
”Like Spark or Vodafone... they control the security”. In
a similar statement, P1 said “I think (security) is just set
up by the Vodafone guy”.
Users had an inherent Trust in Human Nature
Some users showed trust in human nature, trusting that
other people would not act in a manner detrimental
to them. This trust in human nature poses a risk, as
unfortunately not all people may be worthy of this trust.

This lack of trustworthiness does not only apply to
strangers. The high trust in human nature was summed
up by P3, who recognized that they could definitely see
privacy and security risks when selling or giving away a
pre-owned IoT device, observing “Your account info is
still in there. You’d have to trust the people”. However,
the same participant said that they would reset a device
when selling or giving it away to a stranger, but would
not be so concerned if it was going to someone they
knew. As the recipient of a pre-owned device, P3 would
also be trusting of someone they knew, saying they
“Wouldn’t think about (risks). . . I would trust someone I
knew, and would expect them to have reset (the device)”.
This indicated that whilst P3 was aware of at least some
potential risks posed, they would choose to trust people
they knew, assuming them to be trustworthy.
Users Believed that Technology would Protect their
Privacy and Security Also fitting in the area of trust
were the participants who trusted that technology would
assist in the preservation of their privacy and security.
Responses from two participants showed their belief that
in-built technology features would be adequate to act in
defense of any risks posed. Both participants appeared
to believe that technology features would eliminate the
risk to them. When asked about operating a pre-owned
device, P3 commented “There’s usually a reset feature”.
Similarly, P2 stated “If you could factory reset it, it
would be just like new”.
Users were Willing to Believe what they were Told
by Other Sources Some users displayed a willingness
to believe what they were told by others.
The
following responses from two participants demonstrated
a willingness to believe what they were told regarding
privacy and security, even if the participants were at least
partially aware that some level of risk was present.
When participants were asked whether they would
believe that a device was safe to use if they had
been led to believe that it was, P1 responded “Yes,
I would feel at ease if we set our own rules around
use”, and “I would talk to the salesperson about it
and ask whatever questions I wanted to know”. This
showed that P1 trusted the information given to them
by sales staff. Similarly, P5 admitted that they would
“Have to take their word for it” as they “don’t have
the technical know-how to know differently”. This
statement indicated that P5 was willing to believe
information from someone they perceived as having
greater knowledge than themselves.
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3.4.3. Level of Concern relating to Risks A widely
accepted definition for risk is Risk = Likelihood* Impact
[24]
The level that users are concerned with risk has
an impact on their behavior. The use of security
technologies is invalidated where users do not follow
cyber security protocols, or engage in activities that
place themselves at risk [25]. Human factors are gaining
increased attention, in particular where using security
technologies has failed to prevent cyber attack [25] [26].
Participant responses relating to concern about risk
were coded into various categories. Some of these
categories included users who were aware of risks but
were unconcerned, users who were aware of risk but
chose to ignore it, and users who were aware of risk,
but believed ’it won’t happen to me’. Other categories
included users who believed that risk was reduced
because their data were not particularly interesting, and
users who prioritized various other things over risk.
These priorities included users who prioritized time
over risk, users who prioritized effort over risk, users
who prioritized price over risk, and users who did not
prioritize ongoing security.
Aspects of this study also highlighted various
risks associated with different phases of the IoT life
cycle, from purchase of the device, to using the
device, the time when the device becomes unsupported,
and decommissioning (and potential rehoming) of the
device.
Users were Aware of Risks, but were Unconcerned
This category included participants who were aware
of risks, but chose not to be concerned about
them. Responses from two participants highlighted this
awareness or risk, and lack of concern about it.
P1 indicated they would set up the toy, “Figuring out
how to do it without the instructions if possible, then I’d
never look at anything again”. P1 acknowledged they
would not be concerned about security of operating a
pre-owned device, saying “Maybe I might clean it (just)
to have it nice and fresh to start using it, but not to make
sure I was being safe. Even if I bought it off someone I
didn’t know”, and “I know from CSI and stuff that they
do have that big disky thing you can’t clear completely
but I’m not worried”. P2 said “If got a new device in
my home I would do nothing, just interested in getting
it up and running”. P1 admitted “I don’t even know
what I’d do for privacy and security. Probably because I
don’t worry about it that - I’ve never really thought that
far”. P2 stated “I’m not that interested in it... doesn’t
concern me”. P1 said if they had to download an app,
they’d just “Click yes, yes, yes without reading the
privacy statement or anything”. P1 just assumed that

their partner was dealing with network security, but did
not bother asking “It’s not really even a conversation we
had”.
Users were Aware, but Knowingly Chose to Ignore
the Risk Some users were aware of risks, but chose
to ignore them. Some participants elected to take an
’ignorance is bliss’ approach, and one chose to not
think about it so they would not get worried about the
consequences of risks. The following responses from
two participants highlighted their awareness of risk and
choice to ignore it.
P1 said “I don’t feel it could be that much of a threat.
I’m not sure whether it’s just ignorance is bliss and I’m
happy to bury my head in the sand, or if it’s like I don’t
really want to put any energy into something that might
not happen”, and explained “I do like having that whole
outlook the less I know the better, because I don’t really
want to freak myself out over what could happen”. P4
said “Maybe ignorance is bliss, I hadn’t given it much
thought”.
Users believed the Risk ’Won’t Happen to Me’
Some participants were aware that risks were present,
but chose to take the view that an undesirable occurrence
would not happen to them. This could be a way of
dealing with their own fear, or feelings of helplessness
about how to address this risk. The following examples
from two participants showed awareness of risks, but a
belief that the risk would not happen to them.
In the first example, even though P2 recounted
hearing about an actual data security breach only two
days earlier, and discussed the breach in the interview,
they described the likelihood of a threat occurring as
‘very low’. P2 observed “I honestly wouldn’t even think
about it”. P1 said “I don’t feel it could be that much of
a threat”, “I feel it’s unlikely”. P2 shrugged and said “It
doesn’t concern me cause it’s just something you hear
stories about. Apart from (breach victim) I don’t know
anyone it’s happened to, and it hasn’t happened to me.
So. . . ”.
Users Believed their Data were not of Particular
Interest, and that this Reduced Risk Three
participants displayed a self-deprecating attitude, that
their personal data would not be particularly interesting
to anybody else. Because they perceived that their data
were not interesting, they seemed to believe that this
lowered the risk of a security breach occurring, and
that they did not have much to lose if their security
was breached. The following responses are examples
of their perceptions that their personal data were not
particularly interesting, so risk was therefore reduced.
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P3 felt they currently have “No data of interest” but that
sometime in the future they will increase their level of
data privacy and security because “I might have more to
lose when my data is more valuable”. Two participants
found the potential risk scenario amusing. P2 laughed
as they commented “They’d have a fun time if someone
was listening, I don’t know why they’d bother... So no, I
don’t think about it”. P1 also laughed as they explained
“I also feel that if (a breach) happened it’s not the end
of the world... good luck looking at my photos or if you
took my money, there’s not much there to take”.
Users Prioritized Time over Risk At times, desire
to complete a task quickly can take priority over being
careful, which may lead to a security risk. For example,
computer users may automatically click ‘OK’ to boxes
that appear, even when they know that they should
not [27]. Many things were given a higher level of
priority by participants than addressing risk. Responses
from three participants highlighted the presence of time
pressure, and served to illustrate the point that saving
time was afforded a higher priority to them than concern
around risk. P1 said they ”would go for the shortest
time frame”. P5 made the observation that “Time is
precious”. Interestingly, P3 actively lowered security in
order to save time, reporting that on one occasion they
removed the requirement to enter a password because
”Doing it the Mac way saves time”. Therefore, even
though P3 reported that password protecting a device
would ‘definitely’ improve security, they actively chose
to remove this from their laptop.
Users Prioritized Effort over Risk Another thing
that participants chose as a higher priority than
managing risk was reducing effort. Responses from
three participants illustrated how the desire to conserve
energy was higher than the desire to mitigate risk.
As participants did not want bother putting effort into
reducing risk, it obviously was not something of major
concern to them. One participant was aware of risk
but chose to ignore it as they did not want to bother
exerting effort to mitigate the potential threat unless it
became an actual threat. When asked whether they
realistically would take any action to make usage of
devices safer, P3 replied “Probably not... The more
passwords, the less user friendly. And it takes longer
to start and do what you want”. P1 said “I don’t want to
put any energy into something that might not happen”.
In response to the question of whether they would
research security, P1 observed “I think it would be really
effective, especially if you did more than one. But
I wouldn’t bother.” Participant P3 had their passwords
saved in the browser, which they identified as a potential

security risk. However, rather that taking action now,
they chose to wait and hope for the best stating that if
their laptop was stolen, they would “Just cancel their
credit card”.
Users Prioritized Price over Risk Sometimes the
price of devices can lead participants to make risky
decisions.
The well known paper ”The Market
for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism” investigates how the quality of goods
traded in a market may degrade in the presence of
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers,
which leads to only ”lemons” being left behind [28].
The choice of price over quality, and therefore potential
bad decision making was displayed by some participants
where the cost of buying a device took priority over risk.
Two participants admitted that they would be unlikely
to research security for a cheap item. Participants
indicated that price was a motivator as to how much
they would research online reviews. This indicates that
the participants place a higher priority on saving money
than managing risk. P2 said “It depends how much it
is. If it’s a big purchase I would research more, if it’s
cheap I don’t really care”, “nope I wouldn’t consider it.
I’d just say yay, cheap”. P1 said “If it was an expensive
toy I would”.
Users Did Not Prioritize Ongoing Security Some
participants indicated that maintenance of security was
not a high priority to them. At times, participants
showed a lack of interest in keeping security up to
date. Responses from two participants illustrated the
low importance of ongoing security to them. P1 said
“I’d figure out how to do it without the instructions
if possible, then I’d never look at anything again.
Unless I needed to troubleshoot or someone pointed
out something cool it could do. . . I would set up and
forget”. P5 acknowledged they should probably change
their Wi-Fi password saying “Heaps of people know my
password. . . friends and ex partners of the kids over the
years”.

3.5.

There was a Relationship Between
General Privacy and Security, and Data
Privacy and Security

From the interviews conducted, there appeared to
be relationship between an individual’s general security
behavior, and their data privacy and security behavior.
Comments offered by all five participants indicated
that there was a relationship between their general
physical security practices, and their cyber security
practices. Three participants were unconcerned with
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general security, and also took a casual approach to
their online privacy and security. As an example,
P3 considered themself to be at the “lower end” with
physical security of doors and windows at home, and
“leaves the door unlocked”. The reason given was that
they didn’t “have anything valuable”. They currently
were unconcerned, but felt they would increase their
level of data privacy and security sometime in the future
when their data were more valuable.
Two participants found their attitude toward general
and cyber security amusing. P1 laughingly explained
“I’m really bad, I can leave the house unlocked and I’m
not too worried about it. I always feel safe”, saying
”You know how they say are you sure or they give
you the messages? ‘do you accept’, well I just ignore
them and keep going next, next, what’s next”. P2
said “I’m not (security conscious), I just don’t really
think about it”. In contrast, two participants were
conscientious toward both their physical and their cyber
security. P4 considered themself to be ‘fairly security
conscious’, and P5 described themself as ‘quite security
conscious’. These two participants were the only ones
interviewed who said that they would realistically try
to make usage of devices more secure. P4 had already
password protected their smart television, and P5 said “I
would password protect (the device), if I could”. One
of these security conscious participants attributed their
security attitudes to growing up overseas, in a country
they perceived as less safe than Aotearoa.

3.6.

Analysis of Themes using PMT

PMT posits that people protect themselves based
on four factors including perceived severity, perceived
vulnerability, efficacy of a recommended preventative
behavior, and perceived self-efficacy. PMT proved to
be a useful theoretical lens through which to examine
this topic. When related back to PMT, the themed codes
relate to each of these four factors as shown below:

3.6.1. Perceived Severity of a Threatening Event
Perceived severity refers to the extent of severity
or consequence of risk. For example parents will
more likely engage in mediation behavior of their
child’s smartphone use where they perceive that the
consequences of addiction are severe (a high perceived
severity) [29].
In our study, we found that lack of risk awareness
among participants led to a low perceived severity of
a threatening event. Responses confirmed that users’
perception of severity was linked to their awareness of
risk as illustrated below. Several themes concerning

awareness relate to perceived severity of a threatening
event. The themes identified include users were unaware
of risks, users were only partially aware of risk, and
users had a general lack of technical knowledge. Most of
the participants did not understand the severity of risks
involved with using IoT devices in the home. This lack
of awareness highlights a need for education on potential
risks.

3.6.2. Perceived Probability of Occurrence or
Vulnerability It has been reported that perceived
vulnerability to privacy risks positively affects
information privacy concern [30]. In our research,
interview participants showed mainly low levels of
concern about risk, which may be based on perceived
probability of occurrence or vulnerability.
Many
users were aware of risk (to some degree) but were
unconcerned for a variety of reasons. Themes relating
to a lack of concern around risk related to a user’s
perceived probability of the occurrence of a threat. For
the small scale interview participants these included the
following themes, demonstrating low levels of concern
based on low probability of occurrence or vulnerability.
Some users were aware of risk, but were unconcerned.
Other users were aware of risks but choose to ignore
them, some users were aware of risk but believed it
’won’t happen to me’. Some users perceived a reduced
risk because their personal data were not particularly
interesting. Other themes corresponding to perceived
probability of occurrence included users prioritizing
time, effort, and price over addressing risk, and users
not placing a high priority on ongoing security. These
findings confirmed both the need for education on
addressing risk, and a need for behavioral modification.

3.6.3. Efficacy of the Recommended Preventative
Behavior Response efficacy refers to a user’s
evaluation of the perceived effectiveness in performing
a behavior in order to prevent a threat. For example,
parents monitoring their child’s smartphone use would
more likely engage in mediation behaviors where they
perceive their mediation behaviors would be effective
in preventing addiction (have a high level of response
efficacy) [29].
In our research, users placed trust in the efficacy of
recommended preventative behaviors when managing
risk. Many users were willing to trust in the advice
supplied to them, or actions taken, by trusted others.
The following themes concerning trust relate to the
efficacy of the recommended preventative behavior.
Users believed someone else was managing the risk for
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them, users had an inherent trust in human nature, users
believed that technology would assist in the protection
of their privacy and security, and users were willing to
believe what they were told by other sources. Users
trusted in the information or services supplied to them
by people they considered trustworthy, or perceived as
more knowledgeable than themselves. However, no
proof of efficacy was sought by participants. This
demonstrates the need for support from reputable
sources.

3.6.4. Perceived Self-Efficacy How an individual
judges their own ability to complete a computing
task influences their decisions around how they
will use computers [31]. Computer Self Efficacy
has demonstrated significant positive contribution to
cybersecurity computing skills, whilst not showing
significant contribution to misuse intentions [32].
In this research, all interview participants lacked
confidence in their own technical ability, leading to low
perceived self-efficacy. One theme demonstrated this,
that the users were aware of risks but were technically
inept to address that risk. This low level of self-efficacy
showed a need for education and training, with different
types of resources required to assist users in managing
risk. This low level of confidence may have been a
limitation of this piece of work, although this was not
apparent, or specifically asked during the recruitment
process.

4.

Discussion

This study aimed to investigate whether the behavior
of users of IoT in the home aligned with PMT. It
investigated which of the four factors of PMT contribute
to user behavior. Interview results showed that the coded
themes all related back to factors in PMT.
We questioned what behavioral aspects affect the
privacy and security of everyday Aotearoa users of IoT
in the home. We sought to address the question of what
were human barriers to safety in users’ perceptions and
behaviors. We pondered why everyday users may act
in an unsafe manner regarding IoT safety in the home,
and asked what everyday users perceive and understand
about IoT safety in the home, querying why they behave
in the ways that they do. Initial information was sourced
from literature, then deductions were drawn from the
semi-structured interviews that were conducted as part
of the small-scale survey.
Results showed that human barriers to IoT safety
included users being either unaware of risk, or aware
of only limited aspects of risk. Where risk was

identified, users often had low levels of self-efficacy,
and were therefore ill equipped to address that risk.
Users were willing to trust the information of others,
including some who were potentially unqualified to
deliver recommendations, including sales-people or
online reviews by members of the public.
Regarding the perception and understanding of IoT
safety by users, where they have some awareness of
risk, many users found justifications for not addressing
the risk. Users prioritized time, effort and money over
addressing risk. Users chose to place trust in others they
knew, and others they perceived as more knowledgeable
than themselves. Users also believed that technology
would aid in managing their security risks. Users
were often unconcerned about risk, or chose to believe
that occurrences or vulnerabilities would not happen to
them.
There was a belief among users that other people
possessed superior knowledge regarding IoT privacy
and security. Trusted sources included potentially
unqualified sources such as sales people or authors
of online reviews. There was a relationship shown
between users general privacy and security habits and
their cyber security habits. Many users acted with
a small town mentality regarding cyber security, even
though connection to the internet meant that they were
now part of a global community.
Limitations of this research include the low number
of participants, as it was a preliminary study. In
this study, participants were not questioned about their
mental models of how the technology worked, or their
understanding of effective security practices. This study
highlights areas of concern including knowledge of who
to trust; lack of risk awareness; low levels of perceived
self-efficacy; and the scale of internet exposure for
Aotearoa users of IoT in the home.

5.

Future Work

Future work will include a consideration of whether
behavioral economics techniques such nudges and
commitment devices may be appropriate methods to
alter user behavior.
We will also look to other
fields to identify what behavioral mitigations have been
attempted in those areas, and gauge the efficacy of these.
We will draw on research utilising PMT in general
security, and cyber security.
Some potential behavioral mitigation strategies were
discussed with participants during their interviews.
Various differing strategies should be tested to
determine the most effective techniques for increasing
knowledge of trustworthy sources for users; raising
awareness of IoT risk to everyday users; work to
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increase users’ confidence in their self-efficacy to
address risks; and promote understanding of the global
scale of internet privacy and security issues.
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